IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/publus/v49y2019i4p671-693..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Leviathan or Public Steward? Evidence on Local Government Taxing Behavior from New York State

Author

Listed:
  • Austin M Aldag
  • Mildred E Warner
  • Yunji Kim

Abstract

Fiscal federalism argues local governments compete to provide optimal tax-service bundles as responsible public stewards. In contrast, Leviathan theories argue tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are necessary to make local governments fiscally responsible. We analyze local taxing behavior in New York State, which implemented a levy limit in 2012 that allows legislative overrides with 60 percent vote of the local governing board. Our 2017 survey of all general-purpose local governments measured fiscal stress, service responses, and local political attitudes and found 38 percent of municipalities voted to override. Logistic regressions show local governments that have more fiscal stress, weaker property tax bases, higher need, and higher employee benefit costs are more likely to override. These findings support fiscal federalism, as local governments that override are pushing back against state policy in order to respond to local needs. TELs introduce unnecessary rigidity and run counter to the precepts of fiscal federalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Austin M Aldag & Mildred E Warner & Yunji Kim, 2019. "Leviathan or Public Steward? Evidence on Local Government Taxing Behavior from New York State," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(4), pages 671-693.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:49:y:2019:i:4:p:671-693.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjy035
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lowery, David & Sigelman, Lee, 1981. "Understanding the Tax Revolt: Eight Explanations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 963-974, December.
    2. Sara Hinkley, 2017. "Structurally adjusting: Narratives of fiscal crisis in four US cities," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 54(9), pages 2123-2138, July.
    3. Shu Wang, 2018. "Effects of State-Imposed Tax and Expenditure Limits on Municipal Revenue Reliance: A New Measure of TEL Stringency with Mixed Methods," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 48(2), pages 292-316.
    4. Jamie Peck, 2014. "Editor's choice Pushing austerity: state failure, municipal bankruptcy and the crises of fiscal federalism in the USA," Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 7(1), pages 17-44.
    5. Christopher B Goodman, 2018. "Usage of Specialized Service Delivery: Evidence from Contiguous Counties," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 48(4), pages 686-708.
    6. Michael A. Pagano & Jocelyn M. Johnston, 0. "Life at the Bottom of the Fiscal Food Chain: Examining City and County Revenue Decisions," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 30(1), pages 159-170.
    7. Richard Wagner, 1976. "Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 45-61, March.
    8. Shama Gamkhar & J. Mitchell Pickerill, 2012. "The State of American Federalism 2011--2012: A Fend for Yourself and Activist Form of Bottom-Up Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 42(3), pages 357-386, July.
    9. Warner, Mildred, 2001. "State Policy Under Devolution: Redistribution and Centralization," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(3), pages 541-556, September.
    10. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    11. Austin M. Aldag & Mildred Warner, 2018. "Cooperation, not cost savings: explaining duration of shared service agreements," Local Government Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 350-370, May.
    12. Laura REESE, 2012. "CREATIVE CLASS OR PROCREATIVE CLASS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL ECONoMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY," Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 7(1), pages 5-26, February.
    13. Lori Riverstone-Newell, 2017. "The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 47(3), pages 403-425.
    14. Shadbegian, Ronald J., 1999. "The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Revenue Structure of Local Government, 1962-87," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 221-238, June.
    15. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
    16. Warner, Mildred, 2001. "State Policy Under Devolution: Redistribution and Centralization," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 3), pages 541-56, September.
    17. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    18. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
    19. Joseph Drew & Bligh Grant, 2017. "Subsidiarity: More than a Principle of Decentralization—a View from Local Government," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 47(4), pages 522-545.
    20. Shadbegian, Ronald J., 1999. "The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Revenue Structure of Local Government, 1962-87," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 221-38, June.
    21. Sean Nicholson-Crotty & Nick Theobald, 2011. "Claiming Credit in the U.S. Federal System: Testing a Model of Competitive Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(2), pages 232-256, Spring.
    22. McCubbins, Mathew D. & Moule, Ellen, 2010. "Making Mountains of Debt Out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure Limitations," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 63(3), pages 603-621, September.
    23. Jason Sorens, 2011. "The Institutions of Fiscal Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(2), pages 207-231, Spring.
    24. Jered B. Carr & Jayce Farmer, 0. "Contingent Effects of Municipal and County TELs on Special District Usage in the United States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(4), pages 709-733.
    25. Douglas D. Roscoe, 2014. "Yes, Raise My Taxes: Property Tax Cap Override Elections," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(1), pages 145-164, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Davidson & Kevin Ward, 2022. "Post-great recession municipal budgeting and governance: A mixed methods analysis of budget stress and reform," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 54(4), pages 634-652, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yuanshuo Xu & Mildred E. Warner, 2022. "Crowding Out Development: Fiscal Federalism after the Great Recession," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 54(2), pages 311-329, March.
    2. Yuanshuo Xu & Mildred E. Warner, 2015. "Understanding employment growth in the recession: the geographic diversity of state rescaling," Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 8(2), pages 359-377.
    3. Samuel Adams & Kingsley Agomor, 2020. "Decentralization, Partisan Politics, and National Development in Ghana," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 351-366, June.
    4. Sergey Sinelnikov & Pavel Kadochnikov & Ilya Trunin & Sergey Chetverikov & Marianne Vigneault, 2006. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Soft Budget Constraints of Regional Governments," Published Papers 47, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2012.
    5. Mildred E. Warner, 2012. "Does Local Government Size Matter? Privatization and Hybrid Systems of Local Service Delivery," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1212, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Trent J. MacDonald, 2019. "The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18871.
    7. Nalitra Thaiprasert & Dagney Faulk & Michael J. Hicks, 2013. "A Regional Computable General Equilibrium Analysis of Property Tax Rate Caps and a Sales Tax Rate Increase in Indiana," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(4), pages 446-472, July.
    8. Mildred E. Warner, 2013. "Does local government size matter? Privatization and hybrid systems of local service delivery," Chapters, in: Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.), The Challenge of Local Government Size, chapter 11, pages 263-288, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Tianyou Hu & Siddharth Natarajan & Andrew Delios, 2021. "Sister cities, cross-national FDI, and the subnational FDI location decision," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(7), pages 1279-1301, September.
    10. Steven Deller & Judith I. Stallmann & Lindsay Amiel, 2012. "The Impact of State and Local Tax and Expenditure Limitations on State Economic Growth," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 56-84, March.
    11. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    12. Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization - a Survey of the Empirical Literature," MPRA Paper 59889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Schaltegger Christoph A. & Winistörfer Marc M., 2014. "Zur Begrenzung der schleichenden Zentralisierung im Schweizerischen Bundesstaat / On government centralization and its limitation in Switzerland," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 183-228, January.
    14. Michael S. Hayes, 2015. "The Differential Effect of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) on States’ Contributions to Education Funding in States with Binding School District Tax and Expenditure Limitations," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 49-72, March.
    15. Goodman, Christopher B & Leland, Suzanne M., 2017. "Do Cities and Counties Attempt to Circumvent Changes in their Autonomy by Creating Special Districts?," SocArXiv 3rd7v, Center for Open Science.
    16. Goodman, Christopher B, 2019. "Patterns in Special District Creation and Dissolution," SocArXiv zwgjh, Center for Open Science.
    17. Judith I. Stallmann & Steven Deller & Lindsay Amiel & Craig Maher, 2012. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State Credit Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(5), pages 643-669, September.
    18. Perez-Sebastian, Fidel & Raveh, Ohad, 2018. "What drives vertical fiscal interactions? Evidence from the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-268.
    19. Pengju Zhang, 2018. "The unintended impact of tax and expenditure limitations on the use of special districts: the politics of circumvention," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 21-50, February.
    20. ., 2019. "Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling," Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit, chapter 1, pages 14-38, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:49:y:2019:i:4:p:671-693.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/publius .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.