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Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal?

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  • Kanbur, Ravi
  • Haddad, Lawrence

Abstract

The object of this paper is to investigate the implications of intrahousehold bargaining models for the behavior of intrahousehold inequality as a function of total household resources. The authors find theoretical support for Kuznets effects, i.e., a systematic pattern of inequality change as the total household resources increase. The paper also discusses some policy implications of this relationship. In particular, the authors find that bargaining models tend to lead to a greater emphasis on targeting to disadvantaged members of a household. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Kanbur, Ravi & Haddad, Lawrence, 1994. "Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 445-458, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:46:y:1994:i:3:p:445-58
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    1. Haddad, Lawrence & Kanbur, Ravi, 1990. "How Serious Is the Neglect of Intra-Household Inequality?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 866-881, September.
    2. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    3. Behrman, Jere R. & Deolalikar, Anil B., 1988. "Health and nutrition," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 631-711, Elsevier.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
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