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The Role of Risk and Transaction Costs in Contract Design: Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture

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  • Keita Fukunaga
  • Wallace E. Huffman

Abstract

The objective of this article is to provide new empirical evidence on landlord-tenant choices of share versus cash-rent contracts in U.S. agriculture. The focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs, risk-sharing incentives, or both. An empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS) and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk-sharing-incentive motives for landlord-tenant choices of a share versus cash-rent contract. However, the behavior of landlords and tenants is consistent with them being risk averse. Although it is standard to control for the riskiness of the principal's task that is contracted, we find that other attributes of the landlord are an important part of a relatively complex story for U.S. land tenancy contacting. The latter results have generally been ignored in other published landlord-tenant contracting studies. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Keita Fukunaga & Wallace E. Huffman, 2009. "The Role of Risk and Transaction Costs in Contract Design: Evidence from Farmland Lease Contracts in U.S. Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(1), pages 237-249.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:91:y:2009:i:1:p:237-249
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01164.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Zaigham Ali & Fangwei Zhu & Shahid Hussain, 2018. "Risk Assessment of Ex-Post Transaction Cost in Construction Projects Using Structural Equation Modeling," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-20, November.
    2. Stefano Ciliberti & Simone Del Sarto & Angelo Frascarelli & Giulia Pastorelli & Gaetano Martino, 2020. "Contracts to Govern the Transition towards Sustainable Production: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Analysis in the Durum Wheat Sector in Italy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-14, November.
    3. Christine Léger Léger-Bosch, 2018. "Farmland Tenure and Transaction Costs," Working Papers hal-01775201, HAL.
    4. Riekhof, Marie-Catherine, 2019. "The insurance premium in the interest rates of interlinked loans in a small-scale fishery," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 87-112, February.
    5. Qiu, Feng & Goodwin, Barry K. & Gervais, Jean-Philippe, 2011. "An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1-16.
    6. Isaac Maina Kariuki & Jens‐Peter Loy, 2016. "Contractual Farming Arrangements, Quality Control, Incentives, and Distribution Failure in Kenya's Smallholder Horticulture: A Multivariate Probit Analysis," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(4), pages 547-562, November.
    7. Tang, Liang & Ma, Xianlei & Zhou, Yuepeng & Shi, Xiaoping & Ma, Jia, 2019. "Social relations, public interventions and land rent deviation: Evidence from Jiangsu Province in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 406-420.
    8. Douglas W. Allen & Allison Borchers, 2016. "Conservation Practices and the Growth of US Cash Rent Leases," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 491-509, June.
    9. Hu, Wu-Yueh & Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Viaoyong, 2014. "The Role of Risk and Risk-Aversion in Adoption of Alternative Marketing Arrangements by the U.S. Farmers," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 168930, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    10. Paulson Nicholas D & Katchova Ani L & Lence Sergio H, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, May.
    11. Christine Léger Léger-Bosch, 2019. "Farmland tenure and transaction costs: Public and collectively owned land vs conventional coordination mechanisms in France [Régime de tenure foncière et coûts de transaction: terres publiques et c," Post-Print hal-02573765, HAL.
    12. Liu, Elaine M. & Huang, JiKun, 2013. "Risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 202-215.
    13. Paulson Nicholas D & Katchova Ani L & Lence Sergio H, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, May.
    14. Burnett, Wesley & Szmurlo, Daniel & Callahan, Scott, 2022. "Land tenure and conservation adoption: An analysis of contracts and incentives," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322244, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    15. Hotopp, Henning & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2012. "Can rent adjustment clauses reduce the income risk of farms?," International Journal of Agricultural Management, Institute of Agricultural Management, vol. 1(4), pages 1-10, July.
    16. Cao, Yueming & Bai, Yunli & Zhang, Linxiu, 2021. "Plot Size, Adjacency, and Farmland Rental Contract Choice," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 315378, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    17. Grashuis, Jasper & Cook, Michael, 2016. "Governance and Performance in the U.S. Agri-Food Industry: A Comparative Study of Firms and Cooperatives," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235676, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    18. Yueming Cao & Yunli Bai & Linxiu Zhang, 2022. "Plot Size, Adjacency, and Farmland Rental Contract Choice," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-21, April.
    19. Jun Yeong Lee & Grant Durbahn & Peter F. Orazem & Wendong Zhang, 2023. "The roles of risk preferences, selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 54(2), pages 220-233, March.
    20. Angelo Frascarelli & Stefano Ciliberti & Gustavo Magalhães de Oliveira & Gabriele Chiodini & Gaetano Martino, 2021. "Production Contracts and Food Quality: A Transaction Cost Analysis for the Italian Durum Wheat Sector," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-12, March.
    21. Wu-Yueh HU, 2013. "Effect of contract farming on the U.S. crop farmers' average return," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 59(5), pages 195-201.
    22. Baylis, Katherine R. & Chhatre, Ashwini & Prasanna, Satya & Songsermsawas, Tisom, 2012. "Friends or Traders? Do social networks affect the use of market mechanisms by farmers in India," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124889, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    23. Bellemare, Marc F., 2010. "Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy in Madagascar," MPRA Paper 23640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. DRIES, Liesbeth, 2015. "The Determinants Of Resource-Providing Contracts: Case-Study Of The Polish Dairy Sector," Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics (RAAE), Faculty of Economics and Management, Slovak Agricultural University in Nitra, vol. 18(1), pages 1-10, March.
    25. Bigelow, Daniel & Borchers, Allison & Hubbs, Todd, 2016. "U.S. Farmland Ownership, Tenure, and Transfer," Economic Information Bulletin 262138, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

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