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Optimal Self-Protection from Nitrate-Contaminated Groundwater

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  • Richard C. Ready
  • Kimberly Henken

Abstract

Self-protection by well owners from potential nitrate contamination is modeled as an optimal stopping problem, where an owner sequentially tests the well and uses the test results to update his or her subjective probability that the well is contaminated. Because nitrate concentrations in a well vary over time, a single test contains limited information about whether the well is contaminated. The optimal self-protection strategy may therefore involve multiple tests or may not involve any tests at all. For Kentucky wells, optimal self-protection reduces a well owner's expected damage from nitrate contamination by 38%, relative to taking no action. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard C. Ready & Kimberly Henken, 1999. "Optimal Self-Protection from Nitrate-Contaminated Groundwater," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 321-334.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:81:y:1999:i:2:p:321-334
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1244584
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukherjee, Sacchidananda, 2008. "Factors influencing farmers\u2019 willingness to protect groundwater from nonpoint source of pollution in the Lower Bhavani River Basin, Tamil Nadu," Conference Papers h041886, International Water Management Institute.
    2. Tun Lin & Timo Goeschl, 2004. "Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices," Working Papers 2004.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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