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Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines

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  • Querubin, Pablo

Abstract

In many democracies a small subset of individuals enjoys a de facto electoral advantage. The existence of political dynasties, where individuals from a narrow set of families obtain larger vote shares and are more likely to access office, illustrates this phenomenon. In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence of dynastic persistence. More precisely, I provide evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, I find that candidates who barely win their first election by a small margin are around 5 times more likely to have a relative in office in the future than individuals who barely lose their first election and never serve. I discuss alternative channels that may explain dynastic persistence in the Philippines. I argue that access to office and public resources — important in clientelistic democracies like the Philippines — allows incumbents to give relatives an electoral advantage if they first run while they are still in office. Occupational choice, while plausibly important, is less likely to be the main driver of dynastic persistence.

Suggested Citation

  • Querubin, Pablo, 2016. "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(2), pages 151-181, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00014182
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00014182
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Batu, 2017. "Poverty and the Colonial Origins of Elite Capture: Evidence from Philippine Provinces," Working Papers 1708, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    2. Mehmood, Sultan & Seror, Avner, 2023. "Religious leaders and rule of law," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    3. Labonne, Julien & Parsa, Sahar & Querubin, Pablo, 2021. "Political dynasties, term limits and female political representation: Evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 212-228.
    4. Arthur Silve & Thierry Verdier & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-Seeking Elites," CESifo Working Paper Series 10410, CESifo.
    5. Claudio Ferraz & Federico Finan & Monica Maretinez-Bravo, 2020. "Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers wp2020_2008, CEMFI.
    6. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
    7. Siriban, Charles Irvin S., 2023. "Kinship ties and female political participation: The case of Philippine mayors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    8. Gulzar, Saad & Khan, Muhammad Yasir, 2021. ""Good Politicians'': Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance," SocArXiv z9d3f, Center for Open Science.
    9. Dulay, Dean & Go, Laurence, 2021. "First among equals: The first place effect and political promotion in multi-member plurality elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    10. Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Benjamin Crost & Joseph H Felter & Hani Mansour & Daniel I Rees, 0. "Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 34(3), pages 767-789.
    12. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    13. Balán, Pablo & Dodyk, Juan & Puente, Ignacio, 2022. "The political behavior of family firms: Evidence from Brazil," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).

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