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The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare

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  • Doina Radulescu

Abstract

This paper analyses the implications of a bonus tax for compensation components and firm profits, and studies its incidence as well as welfare implications. Using a principal-agent model with endogenous or exogenous reservation wages, we show how the effort-based compensation component changes in the country introducing the tax. Moreover, with exogenous reservation wages, the bonus tax negatively affects profits and dividends such that the incidence falls on the firm's shareholders. With endogenous reservation wages, the results are largely similar.

Suggested Citation

  • Doina Radulescu, 2012. "The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(1), pages 1-16, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201203)68:1_1:teoabt_2.0.tx_2-z
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X631998
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    Cited by:

    1. Hilmer, Michael, 2014. "Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100552, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Fabian Meißner & Georg Schneider & Andreas Scholze, 2014. "Vergleichende Analyse verschiedener Ausprägungen einer erhöhten Besteuerung von Bonuszahlungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 212-241, May.
    3. Dietl, Helmut M. & Grossmann, Martin & Lang, Markus & Wey, Simon, 2013. "Incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal-agent model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 93-104.
    4. Voßmerbäumer, Jan, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 125, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    5. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers' Short-Termism," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    6. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2011. "Taxation and regulation of bonus pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58192, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Rainer Niemann & Mariana Sailer, 2023. "Is analytical tax research alive and kicking? Insights from 2000 until 2022," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(6), pages 1149-1212, August.
    8. Gietl, Daniel & Haufler, Andreas, 2018. "Bonus taxes and international competition for bank managers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 41-60.
    9. Jan Voßmerbäumer, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 64(5), pages 536-561, August.
    10. Voßmerbäumer, Jan & Wagner, Franz W., 2013. "Steuerwirkungen betrieblicher Entgeltpolitik," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 144, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    11. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Too Many to Fail - How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-18, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    12. Diego d'Andria & Ivan Savin, 2015. "Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-004, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    13. Mr. Michael Keen, 2011. "The Taxation and Regulation of Banks," IMF Working Papers 2011/206, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Hilmer, Michael, 2013. "Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation - a welfare analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79703, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Diego d’Andria, 2019. "Tax policy and entrepreneurial entry with information asymmetry and learning," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 1211-1229, October.
    16. Thomas Bauer & Thomas Kourouxous & Peter Krenn, 2018. "Taxation and agency conflicts between firm owners and managers: a review," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 33-76, February.
    17. Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 202-222.
    18. Diego d'Andria, 2016. "Taxation and Incentives to Innovate: A Principal-Agent Approach," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 72(1), pages 96-123, March.
    19. d’Andria, D. & Savin, I., 2018. "A Win-Win-Win? Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 38-56.
    20. Maximilian von Ehrlich & Doina Radulescu, 2017. "The taxation of bonuses and its effect on executive compensation and risk‐taking: Evidence from the UK experience," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 712-731, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bonus tax; labor taxation; effort; manager compensation; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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