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Felfaló árazás. Árazás a versenytárs megsemmisítésére
[Predatory prices. Pricing designed to annihilate competitors]

Author

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  • Erdélyi, Márk

Abstract

A cikk a felfaló árazást mint versenyellenes magatartást mutatja be. A költség alatti árazás azon elméleteit ismerteti - a fogalom megjelenésétől napjainkig -, amelyek a közgazdasági megítélés szempontjából meghatározók. A chicagói iskola megkérdőjelezte a felfaló árazás racionalitását, az Areeda-Turner szerzőpáros a rövid távú átlagos változó költségek alapján közelítette a problémát, majd mások a felfaló árazás hosszú távú hatásait elemezték. A játékelméleti megközelítés más fénybe helyezte a felfaló árazást: azt bizonyos körülmények között mint teljesen racionális magatartást ábrázolta, a közelmúlt és a jelen elméletei pedig újabb módjait mutatták meg a felfaló árazásnak. A cikk kitér azokra a körülményekre is, amelyek az egyébként káros magatartásnak legitimizáló indokai lehetnek. Mivel a beszerzési ár alatti értékesítés manapság a viták kereszttüzében áll, fontos elemezni, hogy az elméletek szerint mikor jelent veszélyt a jólétre a költség alatti árazás. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K21.

Suggested Citation

  • Erdélyi, Márk, 2006. "Felfaló árazás. Árazás a versenytárs megsemmisítésére [Predatory prices. Pricing designed to annihilate competitors]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 365-379.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:838
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    2. Valentiny, Pál, 2004. "Árprés és felfaló árazás. Közgazdasági elmélet, bírói, szabályozói gyakorlat [Price squeezing and predatory pricing. Economic theory and judicial and regulatory practice]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 24-45.
    3. McGee, John S, 1980. "Predatory Pricing Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 289-330, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Török, Ádám, 2009. "Társadalomtudományi tények és természettudományos módszerek [Social scientific facts and natural scientific techniques]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1067-1087.

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    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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