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A kötelező magánnyugdíjpillér három elemi modellje
[Three simple models of the mandatory private pension pillar]

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Listed:
  • Simonovits, András

Abstract

Ebben a tanulmányban három elemi modellt mutatok be részletesen, mindhárom a kötelező magán nyugdíj pillérről szól. 1. Hogyan lehet megbecsülni a magán nyugdíj pillér 1998-2010 közötti hozamát? 2. Kinek érte meg 1998-ban önként belépni a magán nyugdíj pillérbe? 3. Miért nem éri meg a magán nyugdíj pillérből nyugdíjba menni 2020-ban?* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: H11, H55.

Suggested Citation

  • Simonovits, András, 2021. "A kötelező magánnyugdíjpillér három elemi modellje [Three simple models of the mandatory private pension pillar]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 233-250.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1956
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2021.3.233
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Feldstein, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(2), pages 303-320.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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