This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fair Division Of Indivisible Items

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Steven J. Brams
Paul H. Edelman
Peter C. Fishburn ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality and envy-freeness as well as dominance-freeness, evenness of shares, and two criteria based on equally-spaced surrogate utilities, referred to as maxsum and equimax. Maxsum maximizes a measure of aggregate utility or welfare, whereas equimax lexicographically maximizes persons' utilities from smallest to largest. The paper analyzes conflicts among the criteria along with possibilities and pitfalls of achieving fair division in a variety of circumstances.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0040-5833/contents
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 55 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (09)
Pages: 147-180
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:147-180

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Antonio Nicolo' & Yan Yu, 2006. "Strategic Divide and Choose," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0022, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Brams, S.J. & Kaplan, T.R., 2002. "Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System," Working Papers 02-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2009. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 12774, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.