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Privately-Negotiated Input Prices

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  • David Sappington
  • Burcin Unel

Abstract

We examine settings where input prices are negotiated by industry suppliers, rather than dictated by regulators. We find that the input buyer may agree to pay a high price for an input because the high price serves to reduce the intensity of retail price competition with the input seller. Full exploitation of retail customers can result. However, retail price regulation, competition among buyers, and product heterogeneity all can limit the extraction of consumer surplus. We also identify conditions under which input price negotiations will fail to produce a mutually agreeable input price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • David Sappington & Burcin Unel, 2005. "Privately-Negotiated Input Prices," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 263-280, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:27:y:2005:i:3:p:263-280
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-6624-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David E. M Sappington, 2005. "On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1631-1638, December.
    2. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2018. "Endogenous timing when a vertically integrated producer supplies a rival," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, October.
    2. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2020. "Effects of Content Providers' Heterogeneity on Internet Service Providers' Zero-rating Choice," MPRA Paper 107505, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2021.
    3. Sappington, David E.M., 2006. "On the design of input prices: Can TELRIC prices ever be optimal?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 197-215, June.
    4. William P. Rogerson, 2020. "Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 407-436, May.
    5. Shana Cui & David E. M. Sappington, 2021. "Access pricing in network industries with mixed oligopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 193-225, June.
    6. Doucet, Joseph & Littlechild, Stephen, 2006. "Negotiated settlements: The development of legal and economic thinking," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 266-277, December.

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