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On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games

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  • Glazer, Amihai

Abstract

Legislators will enact programs that encourage rent-seeking only if they can thereby increase their chances of winn ing election or of receiving contributions themselves. This paper shows rent-seeking to be electorally robust--both voters and contributors will often avoid a candidate who proposes to eliminate rent-seeking. Important exceptions arise, however, if contributions are more likel y to help challengers than incumbents and if legislators prefer that some firm rather than another receive governmental contracts. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Glazer, Amihai, 1993. "On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 139-148, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:75:y:1993:i:2:p:139-48
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    Cited by:

    1. Liston-Heyes, Catherine, 2001. "Setting the Stakes in Environmental Contests," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-12, January.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "A two-stage rent-seeking contest for instrument choice and revenue division, applied to environmental policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 281-301, May.
    3. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-60, March.
    4. Nti, Kofi O., 2004. "Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1059-1066, November.
    5. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    6. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023. "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).

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