IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v62y1989i1p1-13.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The retention of state governors

Author

Listed:
  • James Adams
  • Lawrence Kenny

Abstract

In this paper, we have provided some support for several hypotheses about the determinants of which governors get reelected. The benefit from being a member of a particular party varies from state to state and from year to year. Personal characteristics such as age are also important. The logits give some support to the importance of coalition formation; reelection is easier in states with low voter turnout and in farm states. The paper is most concerned with the connection between the economic performance and the electoral success of incumbent candidates for governor, and we find support for a model of electoral acountability, in which governors are powerful in state governments and state governments have the ability to differentially tax fixed factors relative to neighboring states. This paper raises some important issues regarding the measurement of variables in political economy, which have wide applicability to other studies in the economics of politics. Peltzman (1988) finds that the difference between the growth rate in state personal income and the national growth rate over a one to four year period prior to the election does not affect gubernatorial electoral outcomes. Concurrently, we find that the current year's growth rate in state personal income and its difference from the national growth rate are not significantly related to electoral success but that the average deviation from predicted state personal income during the governor's tenure in office is significantly related to the odds of getting reelected. That is, the data reject simplistic views of voter behavior and support a sophisticated model of voter behavior. Similarly, Peltzman (1988) has greater success using more sophisticated, cumulative measures of national economic performance. This suggests that great care must sometimes be taken to create variables that are capable of giving our economic models a fair hearing. Voting studies often find that only current period effects matter, which is attributed either to voter myopia or — and this is the more popular explanation nowadays — to the confinement of effects by rational expectations to current period, ‘white noise’ effects. The specifications in these voter studies ignore the cumulative information generated in political economy. Both our results and Peltzman's (1988) results suggest that variables that reflect this cumulative information may be more successful than variables that are based only on the current year. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • James Adams & Lawrence Kenny, 1989. "The retention of state governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 1-13, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00168010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00168010
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00168010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Robert E, 1978. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 971-987, December.
    2. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 159-173, May.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1988. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Working Papers 53, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Epple, Dennis & Zelenitz, Allan, 1981. "The Implications of Competition among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1197-1217, December.
    5. Adams, James D & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1986. "Optimal Tenure of Elected Public Officials," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 303-328, October.
    6. Gary Chamberlain, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(1), pages 225-238.
    7. Meltzer, Allan H & Vellrath, Marc, 1975. "The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 781-798, December.
    8. Kramer, Gerald H., 1971. "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 131-143, March.
    9. Peltzman, Sam, 1987. "Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 293-297, May.
    10. Stigler, George J, 1973. "General Economic Conditions and National Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 160-167, May.
    11. Meltzer, Allan H & Vellrath, Marc, 1975. "The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections: Reply," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 803-805, December.
    12. Adams, James D., 1986. "Equilibrium taxation and experience rating in a federal system of unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 51-77, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Robert Tannenwald & Jennifer Weiner & Igor Popov, 2010. "Genesis of State–Local Creativity," Chapters, in: Sally Wallace (ed.), State and Local Fiscal Policy, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    3. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    4. Borgschulte, Mark & Vogler, Jacob, 2019. "Run for your life? The effect of close elections on the life expectancy of politicians," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 18-32.
    5. Sun, Sunny Li & Peng, Mike W. & Lee, Ruby P. & Tan, Weiqiang, 2015. "Institutional open access at home and outward internationalization," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 234-246.
    6. Florian Neumeier, 2018. "Do Businessmen Make Good Governors?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2116-2136, October.
    7. Gomberg, Andrei & Gutiérrez, Emilio & López, Paulina & Vázquez, Alejandra, 2019. "Coattails and the forces that drive them: Evidence from Mexico," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 64-81.
    8. Christopher Decker & Mark Wohar, 2007. "Do increases in petroleum product prices put the incumbent party at risk in US presidential elections?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 727-737.
    9. David Mitchell & Keith Willett, 2006. "Local Economic Performance and Election Outcomes," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(2), pages 219-232, June.
    10. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
    11. Daniel J. Benjamin & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2009. "Thin-Slice Forecasts of Gubernatorial Elections," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 91(3), pages 523-536, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
    2. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr, 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 149-180, July.
    3. Paul R. Blackley & Edward M. Shepard, 1994. "A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of State-Level Economic Conditions On the 1992 Presidential Election," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(3), pages 366-382, July.
    4. Christopher Decker & Mark Wohar, 2007. "Do increases in petroleum product prices put the incumbent party at risk in US presidential elections?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 727-737.
    5. Henry Chappell & William Keech, 1985. "The political viability of rule-based monetary policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 125-140, January.
    6. Walker A. Pollard, 1983. "Presidential Elections: Cyclical and Distributional Economic Effects," Public Finance Review, , vol. 11(2), pages 217-236, April.
    7. Amanat ALI* & Eatzaz AHMAD** & BILAWAL***, 2019. "SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEPRIVATIONS AND VOTERS’ PREFERENCES: A District Level Analysis," Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, Applied Economics Research Centre, vol. 29(2), pages 181-199.
    8. Paola Assael & Felipe Larraín, 1994. "El Ciclo Político-económico: Teoría, Evidencia y Extensión para una Economía Abierta," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 31(92), pages 87-114.
    9. Gikas Hardouvelis & Dimitrios Thomakos, 2007. "Consumer Confidence and Elections," Working Papers 0003, University of Peloponnese, Department of Economics.
    10. Liberini, Federica & Redoano, Michela & Proto, Eugenio, 2017. "Happy voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 41-57.
    11. Robert Michaels, 1986. "Reinterpreting the role of inflation in politico-economic models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 113-124, January.
    12. Franch, Fabio, 2021. "Political preferences nowcasting with factor analysis and internet data: The 2012 and 2016 US presidential elections," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    13. Ray C. Fair, 2009. "Presidential and Congressional Vote‐Share Equations," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 55-72, January.
    14. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Melvin Stephens Jr., 2013. "Employment, Wages, and Voter Turnout," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 111-143, October.
    15. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    16. Reinhard Neck & Friedrich Schneider, 2024. "The popularity function: a spurious regression? The case of Austria," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 298-329, February.
    17. Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Corruption And Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross‐Section Of Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 179-200, July.
    18. Wiesen, Taylor, 2023. "Aggregate earnings and market expectations in United States presidential election prediction markets," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    19. Monika Bartkowska & Guido Tiemann, 2015. "The Impact of Economic Perceptions on Voting Behaviour in European Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 201-217, March.
    20. Jeroen Klomp, 2020. "Election or Disaster Support?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 205-220, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:1:p:1-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.