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Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology

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  • Douglas Hart
  • Michael Munger

Abstract

This paper advances the hypothesis that improvements in the national transportation and communication infrastructure are responsible for the ‘vanishing marginals’ or the increased electoral security of U.S. Representatives. We assume that margin and security are directly affected by the amount of time a legislator, or a member of her staff, devotes to direct contact with constituents in the home district. Formally, we demonstrate that a decline in the time opportunity cost associated with travel to the district improves victory margins, where we proxy improvement in transportation technology by using a distance variable across three different historical samples: 1890, 1928, and 1970. This proposition offers a potentially more fundamental explanation of declining electoral competition than existing explanations focusing on professionalism, careerism, redistricting and bureaucratic casework. In fact, the technology/communication hypothesis may well encompass such explanations. The model specified here offers at best a crude test of the hypothesis that technology and communication are the cause of the vanishing marginals. A superior test would include the actual time required to travel to each district in each sample year, because a closer, but more inaccessible, location would be less electorally favorable, according to the logic underlying our model. While distance is therefore an imperfect proxy, we are encouraged by the results of the preliminary test. The next step for future research is to identify which technological innovations have had the greatest impact. In order to accomplish this, a more complete model of the link between legislators and constituents must be established. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas Hart & Michael Munger, 1989. "Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 217-228, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:61:y:1989:i:3:p:217-228
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00123885
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Born, Richard, 1979. "Generational Replacement and the Growth of Incumbent Reelection Margins in the U.S. House," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 811-817, September.
    2. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    3. Mann, Thomas E. & Wolfinger, Raymond E., 1980. "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 617-632, September.
    4. Fiorina, Morris P., 1977. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 177-181, March.
    5. Garand, James C. & Gross, Donald A., 1984. "Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 17-30, March.
    6. Uslaner, Eric M., 1981. "The Case of the Vanishing Liberal Senators: The House Did It," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 105-113, January.
    7. Ferejohn, John A., 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 166-176, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Battaglini, Marco & Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2020. "Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress," CEPR Discussion Papers 15270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Borck, Rainald & Owings, Stephanie, 2003. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, March.
    3. Zoltán Fazekas & Martin Ejnar Hansen, 2022. "Incentives for non-participation: absence in the United Kingdom House of Commons, 1997–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 51-73, April.
    4. Arsene Aka & W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg & Zhen Zhu, 1996. "Is There A “Culture Of Spending” In Congress?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 191-211, November.

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