The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00054447
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References listed on IDEAS
- Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
- Donald G. Saari, 1985. "The Optimal Ranking Method is the Borda Count," Discussion Papers 638, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Saari, Donald G., 1987. "The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Niemi, Richard G., 1984. "The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 952-958, December.
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