Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/BF00125721
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Hillman, Arye L. & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 129-142, November.
- Richard McKenzie, 1986. "Tax/compensation schemes: Misleading advice in a rent-seeking society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 189-194, January.
- Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-1187, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- William Kaempfer & Thomas Willett, 1989. "Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 79-86, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016.
"Where are the rent seekers?,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
- Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the Rent Seekers?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5833, CESifo.
- Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
- Christian Bjørnskov, 2012. "Can bribes buy protection against international competition?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 148(4), pages 751-775, December.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989.
"Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
- Sébastien Jean & David Laborde & Will Martin, 2008.
"Choosing Sensitive Agricultural Products in Trade Negotiations,"
Working Papers
2008-18, CEPII research center.
- Jean, Sebastien & Laborde, David & Martin, Will, 2008. "Choosing sensitive agricultural products in trade negotiations:," IFPRI discussion papers 788, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
- Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
- Francis,David C. & Kubinec ,Robert, 2022. "Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-levelPolitical Influence in 41 Economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10119, The World Bank.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2013.
"Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 829-842.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence," Munich Reprints in Economics 19288, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Globalization and Labor Market Institutions: International Empirical Evidence," ifo Working Paper Series 154, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Gil S Epstein, 2012. "Employer’s information and promotion-seeking activities," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 21-32.
- Joshua Aizenman & Sang‐Seung Yi, 1998.
"Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment,"
Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-10, February.
- Joshua Aizenman & Sang-Seung Yi, 1997. "Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment," NBER Working Papers 6123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2003.
"Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(1), pages 137-154, February.
- Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2003. "Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 137-154, March.
- Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2000. "Is Environmental Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1507, Econometric Society.
- Jon Wisman, 2001.
"Creative destruction and labor's options,"
Forum for Social Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2), pages 51-76, January.
- Jon Wisman, 2001. "Creative destruction and labor's options," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 51-76, March.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007.
"Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Baldwin, Richard E. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2007. "Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19726, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Baldwin, Richard & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2006. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kahana, Nava & Qijun, Liu, 2010. "Endemic corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 82-88, March.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001.
"Protection, lobbying, and market structure,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
- Long, N.V. & Soubeyran, A. & Hillman, A., 1998. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a24, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO.
- Dzhumashev, Ratbek, 2014. "Corruption and growth: The role of governance, public spending, and economic development," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 202-215.
- Aaron Tornell, 1989. "Inconsistencia dinámica de los programas proteccionistas," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 4(1), pages 61-82.
- Aksel Erbahar & Yuan Zi, 2015. "Cascading Trade Protection: Theory and Evidence from the U.S," CTEI Working Papers series 04-2015, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:58:y:1988:i:2:p:169-172. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.