Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00123807
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- Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
- Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Efficient rents 3 back to the bog," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 259-263, January.
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- Gordon Tullock, 1992. "Games and Preference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 24-32, January.
- Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998.
"Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998. "Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
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