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Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions

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  • Robert Blewett
  • Roger Congleton

Abstract

This paper explores some perverse features that can emerge when social contracts are moved from a social vacuum to a setting of social interdependence. In particular we note incentives that might exist in conjunction with externality problems that yield situations in which: (1) social contracts reduce social wealth; (2) sub-global social contracts are Pareto inferior to the absence of social contracts; (3) there are no incentives for global social contracts. While previous works emphasized the benefits of contracts, this paper focuses on their costs. A conclusion reached is that perhaps justice and efficiency demand not a single global social contract but rather a rich melange of sub-global contracts with appropriate interstices of anarchy. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton, 1983. "Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 441-448, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:3:p:441-448
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00141077
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milton Kafoglis & Richard Cebula, 1981. "The Buchanan-Tullock model: Some extensions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 179-186, January.
    2. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    3. Laurence Moss, 1980. "Optimal jurisdictions and the economic theory of the state: Or, anarchy and one-world government are only corner solutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 17-26, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus," Working Papers 18-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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