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Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting

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  • Peter Fishburn
  • Steven Brams

Abstract

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates can affect the outcome. It also considers generic powers of voters and the extent to which approval voting treats voters equitably. If there are three candidates, votes for one or two candidates are equally efficacious in large electorates. For four or more candidates, votes for about half the candidates are most efficacious. Although inequities among voters can arise under approval voting, the common plurality voting system is considerably less equitable than approval voting. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 425-434, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:3:p:425-434
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00133743
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1977. "Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 72-91, June.
    2. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
    3. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    4. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    5. Riker, William H., 1964. "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 341-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Menezes, Mozart B.C. & da Silveira, Giovani J.C. & Drezner, Zvi, 2016. "Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and Approval Voting compared with Median and Coverage locations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(1), pages 195-203.
    2. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
    3. Jac C. Heckelman, 2015. "Properties and paradoxes of common voting rules," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 15, pages 263-283, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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