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Legislative profits and the economic theory of representative voting: An empirical investigation

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  • Burton Abrams

Abstract

The statistical findings of this study support the economic theory of representative voting. In general, producer and consumer groups influence representative voting behavior as expected. The findings suggest that legislators act “rationally” when confronted by competing lobbying groups. The consistently positive and highly significant influence of MSB share which serves to measure MSB influencerelative to the other bank groups indicates that legislators appear to consider opportunity costs in their decision-making calculus. The findings are also consistent with the Downs-Stigler hypothesis that producer-lobbyist groups have a comparative advantage over consumer-voters in the marketplace for legislative profits. The larger β-coefficient for MSB share than for the consumer-voter variables indicates that MSB share was a more influential determinant of legislators' voting behavior. The mixed statistical results for the consumer-voter variables leads one to place less confidence in the importance of their influence in determining legislators' voting preferences. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1977

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  • Burton Abrams, 1977. "Legislative profits and the economic theory of representative voting: An empirical investigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-119, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:31:y:1977:i:1:p:111-119
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718976
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Silberman, Jonathan I & Durden, Garey C, 1976. "Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 317-329, April.
    2. Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
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    1. Charles Delorme & R. Hill & Norman Wood, 1981. "The determinants of voting by the National Labor Relations Board on unfair labor practice cases: 1955–1975," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 207-218, January.
    2. Henry Chappell, 1981. "Conflict of interest and congressional voting: A note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 331-335, January.
    3. Harry de Gorter & Johan F. M. Swinnen, 1994. "The Economic Polity Of Farm Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 312-326, September.
    4. Gershon Alperovich, 1984. "The economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authories," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 285-296, January.
    5. de Gorter, Harry & Rausser, Gordon C., 1989. "Endogenizing U.S. milk price supports," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4f58t530, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.

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