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The political economy of rights

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  • Mario Ferrero

    (University of Eastern Piedmont)

Abstract

After World War II, the quest for rights began to address the interests of particular groups, including minorities, children, women, animals, the environment, and workers. Many groups, however, continued or started to rely on the market, or private collective action, to further their interests. This paper offers a model to explain the choice between market and political action. Benefits achieved through collective action are a club good whose benefits are enjoyed and costs are borne by the group. Rights are a public good which benefits the whole class of people who qualify while its costs are borne only by the fighters, which invites free riding. Therefore, rights are more costly to achieve, but their benefits are higher because they are harder to undo and may facilitate further action; so they are chosen if their benefit/cost ratio is higher than that of collective action. The history of the American labor, black freedom, and women’s movements, and their intersections, provides a good fit for the model’s predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Ferrero, 2024. "The political economy of rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 297-316, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:198:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01124-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01124-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mario Ferrero, 2020. "A theory of revolutionary organizations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 245-273, September.
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      More about this item

      Keywords

      Rights; Collective action; Club goods; Public goods; Labor movement; Women’s movement; Civil rights movement;
      All these keywords.

      JEL classification:

      • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
      • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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