The supply and demand of marital contracts: the case of same-sex marriage

Each state offers a standard marital contract and controls access to it. Married couples enjoy many benefits under U.S. federal and state laws, such as veteran and military pensions, immigration preference, Social Security payments, and tax deductions. Although many of these benefits were introduced for other purposes, we argue that the growth in welfare programs indirectly increased the value of the marital contract over time. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples could now access marital contracts—and consequently the benefits tied to marital status—in all 50 U.S. states. We view the legalization of same-sex marriage as the predictable supply response to an increase in the demand for access to the marital contract, which followed from an increase in its value over time. We test this hypothesis at both state and federal levels. Using cross-sectional data at the state level, we show that variation in state spending on benefits can explain variation in the length of years that same-sex marriage was legalized in a state prior to Obergefell. At the federal level, we show how federal expansions of benefits over time corresponded to increased expenditures on lobbying for same-sex marriage.