IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v195y2023i3d10.1007_s11127-021-00872-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The rule of rules

Author

Listed:
  • Alan Hamlin

    (University of Manchester)

Abstract

Rules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Hamlin, 2023. "The rule of rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 231-250, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:195:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00872-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00872-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-021-00872-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-021-00872-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2016. "Norms Make Preferences Social," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 608-638, June.
    2. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2008. "On the Economics of Moral Preferences," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 605-628, October.
    3. Alan Hamlin, 2014. "Reasoning about rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 68-87, March.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    5. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    6. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
    7. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    8. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
    9. Sugden, Robert, 2011. "Salience, inductive reasoning and the emergence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 35-47, June.
    10. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
    11. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    12. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
    13. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    14. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1994. "A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 345-368, July.
    15. Georg Vanberg, 2018. "Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and institutional design," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 199-216, December.
    16. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    17. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    18. Oliver Hart, 2017. "Incomplete Contracts and Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1731-1752, July.
    19. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1995. "Economizing on virtue," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 35-56, December.
    20. James Buchanan, 1972. "Rawls on justice as fairness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 123-128, September.
    21. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    22. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2020. "J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: political economy for democratic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 339-370, June.
    23. Salzberger, Eli M., 1993. "A positive analysis of the doctrine of separation of powers, or: Why do we have an independent judiciary?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 349-379, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lars P. Feld & Daniel Nientiedt, 2023. "The Freiburg School and the Virginia School: introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 193-196, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    2. Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler, 2023. "Standing on the shoulders of giants or science? Lessons from ordoliberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 197-211, June.
    3. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary," CESifo Working Paper Series 1260, CESifo.
    4. Scott Dallman & Anusha Nath & Filip Premik, 2021. "The Effect of Constitutional Provisions on Education Policy and Outcomes," Staff Report 623, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.
    6. Lenger Alexander & Goldschmidt Nils, 2011. "Ordnungsökonomik als angewandte Wissenschaft. Zur notwendigen Zusammenführung von Theorie und Praxis / Constitutional Economics as an Applied Social Science. About the Essential Combination of Theory ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 343-364, January.
    7. George Crowley, 2012. "Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 134-165, June.
    8. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2015. "Constitutional political economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 15/06, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    9. Frimpong Boamah, Emmanuel, 2018. "Constitutional economics of Ghana’s decentralization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 256-267.
    10. Mingyu Liu, 2024. "Structural and functional analysis of Buchanan’s constitutional contract," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, December.
    11. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    12. Justin Callais & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "Does constitutional entrenchment matter for economic freedom?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 808-830, October.
    13. Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 319-330.
    14. Cohen, Alon, 2014. "Independent judicial review: A blessing in disguise," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 209-220.
    15. Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolás Eterovic, 2012. "Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 333-363, December.
    16. Wafa Ghardallou & Dorsaf Sridi, 2020. "Democracy and Economic Growth: a Literature Review," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(3), pages 982-1002, September.
    17. Pierre Mandon & Clément Mathonnat, 2015. "Forms of Democracies and Financial Development," Working Papers halshs-01196108, HAL.
    18. Aidt, Toke S. & Eterovic, Dalibor S., 2011. "Political competition, electoral participation and public finance in 20th century Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 181-200, March.
    19. Fiorino, Nadia & Gavoille, Nicolas & Padovano, Fabio, 2015. "Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 56-66.
    20. Benjamin Broman & Georg Vanberg, 2022. "Feuding, arbitration, and the emergence of an independent judiciary," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 162-199, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rules; Laws; Norms; Conventions; Constitutions; Rule-following; Political order;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:195:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00872-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.