Lobbying and (de)centralization
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9519-7
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Martin Gregor & Lenka Stastna, 2012.
"The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(1), pages 41-69, March.
- Martin Gregor & Lenka Š astná, 2011. "The Decentralization Tradeoff for Complementary Spillovers," Working Papers IES 2011/13, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Apr 2011.
- Esteller-Moré, Alejandro & Galmarini, Umberto & Rizzo, Leonzio, 2012. "Vertical tax competition and consumption externalities in a federation with lobbying," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 295-305.
- Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
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More about this item
Keywords
International unions; Fiscal federalism; Lobbying; F02; D72; H77;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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