Antitrust public choice(s)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9540-x
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More about this item
Keywords
Antitrust; Public choice; Real business cycles; D72; L40; K21; E61;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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