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The tragedy of the political commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate roll call votes on environmental legislation

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  • Anwar Hussain
  • David Laband

Abstract

When the costs of regulation are borne by individuals outside of their political jurisdiction, an elected politician arguably will vote in favor of socially costly regulations because from his/her narrow perspective even small marginal benefits outweigh zero marginal costs. Our empirical analysis of the environmental voting records of U.S. Senators from 1991 to 2002 reveals a pronounced tendency for Senators to vote against (in favor of) environmental bills that impose costs in their (other) states. The straightforward implication is that elected politicians overgraze the regulatory pasture. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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  • Anwar Hussain & David Laband, 2005. "The tragedy of the political commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate roll call votes on environmental legislation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 353-364, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:353-364
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2052-4
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    1. Herrnstadt, Evan & Muehlegger, Erich, 2014. "Weather, salience of climate change and congressional voting," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 435-448.
    2. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2012. "Sind Moscheen in Deutschland NIMBY-Güter?," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 23, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    3. David N. Laband & Michael Nieswiadomy, 2006. "Factors Affecting Species' Risk Of Extinction: An Empirical Analysis Of Esa And Natureserve Listings," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 160-171, January.
    4. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.

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