This paper corrects a long-standing error in elementary geometrical constructions that involve collective choices in multidimensional settings. The seemingly innocuous assumption of separability among arguments in individual utility functions does not imply symmetric indifference contours in shared goods space. Shared goods necessarily become gross substitutes when resource or budgetary constraints are introduced. The corrected construction suggests that issue-by-issue voting is less efficacious than is indicated in the conventional analysis. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 115 (2003) Issue (Month): 3-4 (June) Pages: 285-98 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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