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Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem

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  • Pecorino, Paul

Abstract

The effect of changes in industry structure on the ability to maintain a cooperative level of tariff lobbying are analyzed in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement mechanism. The difficulty of maintaining cooperation is identified with the minimum discount factor necessary for the maintenance of cooperation. Factors which increase this critical value of the discount parameter are said to make cooperation more difficult. Some changes in industry structure which reduce measured concentration have ambiguous effects, while others may make cooperation among a given group of firms more likely. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Pecorino, Paul, 2001. "Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 203-220, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:106:y:2001:i:3-4:p:203-20
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    Cited by:

    1. Cole, Matthew T. & Lake, James & Zissimos, Ben, 2021. "Contesting an international trade agreement," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    2. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Miles Kellerman, 2021. "Market structure and disempowering regulatory intermediaries: Insights from U.S. trade surveillance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1350-1369, October.
    4. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
    5. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012. "Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
    6. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2007. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 9-29, March.
    7. James Hollyer, 2010. "Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 387-431, December.
    8. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.

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