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Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

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  • Eric Fricke

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between board holdings, compensation and the turnover of underperforming mutual fund managers. Previous studies find that some fund managers consistently underperform their peers over long periods of time. The presence of these consistent underperforming funds might be partially explained by ineffective monitoring whereby board interests are not aligned with those of shareholders. Based on 2003 data collected from 606 mutual funds, our results provide evidence that underperforming fund managers have a lower probability of being replaced when their boards have lower holdings and higher compensation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Fricke, 2015. "Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:47:y:2015:i:3:p:295-312
    DOI: 10.1007/s10693-014-0196-4
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    Cited by:

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    2. Mamatzakis, Emmanuel & Xu, Bingrun, 2017. "Does corporate governance matter in fund management company: the case of china," MPRA Paper 76138, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mutual funds; Board of directors; Manager turnover; G23; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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