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Predation and Accumulation

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Author Info
 Grossman, Herschel I
Kim, Minseong

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Abstract

This article incorporates the economic theory of predation into the theory of economic growth. The analytical framework is a general-equilibrium model of the interaction between two dynasties: a potential predator and its prey. We find that the rate of accumulation of capital and the security of poverty are positively related only for generations of the prey dynasty that tolerate predation. Generations of the prey dynasty that choose to deter predation, even though their property is perfectly secure, accumulate productive capital more slowly than the preceding generations that tolerated predation. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Growth.

Volume (Year): 1 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 333-50
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:1:y:1996:i:3:p:333-50

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Perotti, Roberto, 1992. "Income Distribution, Politics, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 311-16, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Grossman, Herschel I., 1995. "Robin hood and the redistribution of property income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-410, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Daniel Mejía & Carlos Posada, . "Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth," Borradores de Economia 257, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
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  2. V. Heinrich S. Amavilah, 2005. "The Structure and Equilibrium Conditions of a Generalized Economic Canopy: A Note," Development and Comp Systems 0505015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Pessoa, Samuel de Abreu & Barelli, Paulo, 2002. "A Model of Capital Accumulation and Rent-Seeking," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 449, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  4. Ricardo Arguello, 2004. "Revisiting the Relationship between Income Distribution and Economic Growth," BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 004336, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. [Downloadable!]
  5. George Economides & Sarantis Kalyvitis & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2004. "Do Foreign Aid Transfers Distort Incentives and Hurt Growth? Theory and Evidence from 75 Aid-recipient Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Paulo Barelli & Samuel de Abreu Pess, 2002. "A Model of Capital Accumulation and Rent-Seeking," Penn CARESS Working Papers 4392bb4732a00ee414b60ef8a, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Holger Strulik, 2004. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Alex Coram, 2006. "An asymmetric dynamic struggle between pirates and producers," Working Papers 2006-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Cem Karayalcin, 2005. "Divided We Stand, United We Fall: The Hume-Weber-Jones Mechanism for the Rise of Europe," Working Papers 0509, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ugo Panizza, 1999. "Desigualdad del ingreso y crecimiento económico: elementos de juicio de datos de USA," RES Working Papers 4179, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  12. Cem Karayalcin, 2005. ""Romes without Empires": Primate Cities, Political Competition, and Economic Growth," Working Papers 0510, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Wick, Katharina, 2007. "Conflict and Production: An Application to Natural Resources," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 34, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ugo Panizza, 1999. "Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Evidence from the American Data," RES Working Papers 4178, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  15. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2006. "Rent-Seeking Competition from State Coffers: A Calibrated DSGE Model of the Euro Area," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  16. Roland Benabou, 1997. "Inequality and Growth," NBER Working Papers 5658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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