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Do institutions for collective action evolve?

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  • Elinor Ostrom

Abstract

In this paper I will provide an overview of our findings from studying irrigation systems in the field so that readers who are not familiar with our prior research gain at least an initial sense of these findings. I will provide a second short overview —this time of the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework offering a general method for doing institutional analysis. I will then introduce the possibility of looking at the change of rules as an evolutionary process. The method for studying the evolution of rules will be based on the IAD framework and on our long-term study of rules related to irrigation systems. In the conclusion, I return to the question as to why it is important to authorize resource users’ relative autonomy in the development of their own rules and to learn from the resulting institutional diversity. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Elinor Ostrom, 2014. "Do institutions for collective action evolve?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 3-30, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbioec:v:16:y:2014:i:1:p:3-30
    DOI: 10.1007/s10818-013-9154-8
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    7. Ulrich Witt, 2013. "The Future of Evolutionary Economics: Why Modalities Matter," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2013-09, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    8. Ortiz-Riomalo, Juan Felipe & Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Engel, Stefanie, 2022. "Fostering co-operation through participation in natural resource management. An integrative review," EconStor Preprints 253261, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
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    16. Fouladvand, Javanshir, 2022. "Behavioural attributes towards collective energy security in thermal energy communities: Environmental-friendly behaviour matters," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 261(PB).
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    18. Danuta Milaszewicz & Kesra Nermend, 2020. "Application of Vector Measure Construction Methods to Estimate Quality of Institutions: Nations in Transition," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 2), pages 16-29.
    19. Insa Theesfeld & Tom Dufhues & Gertrud Buchenrieder, 2017. "The effects of rules on local political decision-making processes: How can rules facilitate participation?," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 50(4), pages 675-696, December.
    20. Shanshan Miao & Xueqin Zhu & Wim Heijman & Zengwei Xu & Qian Lu, 2022. "Deeds and Words: Farmers’ Attitude-Paradox in Collective Action for Small-Scale Irrigation," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, December.
    21. Nourani, Vesall & Maertens, Annemie & Michelson, Hope, 2021. "Public good provision and democracy: Evidence from an experiment with farmer groups in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    22. Gaofeng Xu & Jian Liu, 2023. "Institutional Diversity or Isomorphism? Research on the Evolution of Collective-Owned Construction Land Marketization Reform since the 1990s—The Case of Shunde and Wujiang, China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-18, March.

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