Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Kai A. Konrad
• Sebastian Georg Kessing
• Christos Kotsogiannis

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 16 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 105-123
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:16:y:2009:i:1:p:105-123

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Related research

Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Hold-up problem; Federalism; Vertical tax competition; Bidding for firms; Tax base cooccupation; F34; F42; H11; H71; H77;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Schnitzer, Monika, 1999. "Expropriation and control rights: A dynamic model of foreign direct investment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(8), pages 1113-1137, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Schnitzer, Monika, 1998. "Expropriation and Control Rights: A Dynamic Model of Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 1891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2007. "Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 17-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Eckhard Janeba, 2000. "Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1508-1519, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Timothy Besley & Paul Seabright, 1999. "The effects and policy implications of state aids to industry: an economic analysis," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 13-53, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Matthias Wrede, 2000. "Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 163-175, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Boadway, R & Keen, M, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," IFS Working Papers W96/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
   Other versions:
   • Robin Boadway and Michael Keen, . "Efficiency and the Optimal Direction of Federal-State Transfers," Economics Discussion Papers 445, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
   • Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1996. "Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-155, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Svejnar, Jan & Smith, Stephen C, 1984. "The Economics of Joint Ventures in Less Developed Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 149-67, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary States," IZA Discussion Papers 239, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary States," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
9. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March. [Downloadable!]
10. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1984. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations From Perfect Capital Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1984. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect Capital Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 16-40, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Kehoe, Patrick J, 1989. "Policy Cooperation among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 289-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Chris Doyle & Sweder Wijnbergen, 1994. "Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 211-225, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-18.