This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Do Subjects Separate (or Are They Sophisticated)?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John Hey ()
Jinkwon Lee ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In many experiments, particularly individual choice experiments, experimenters ask many questions to the subjects and use the random lottery incentive mechanism to give an incentive to the subjects. That is, the experimenter, at the end of the experiment, picks just one of the questions, plays out that question, and pays the subject on the basis of this one question. The idea is that subjects should separate the various questions and reply to each as if it were a separate question—in isolation from all the other questions in the experiment. This procedure is methodologically sound if the subjects behave in accordance with Expected Utility (EU) theory, since this theory says that the best procedure for the subjects is to separate the various questions. However, if there is any doubt as to whether the subjects obey EU theory, and particularly if the experiment is designed to test whether the behaviour of the subjects is in accordance with EU, this incentive mechanism is open to criticism. Indeed many referees use this argument against the research. The response that the subjects may not respect EU, yet still separate the various questions, is obviously open to objection and generally it is not clear whether this response is valid or not. There have been two direct tests of this separation hypothesis (by Starmer and Sugden (1991) and by Cubitt et al. (1998), which suggest that it is valid, but further evidence is required. This paper provides a further, stronger, test of this hypothesis: we confront the two stories—(1) that the subjects answer the various questions separately, and (2) that the subjects respond to the experiment as a whole—using experimental data from an experiment in which the random lottery incentive mechanism was used. Our analysis shows that it would appear that subjects do answer as if they were separating the questions. This should be considered reassuring for those experimenters who use the random lottery incentive mechanism. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-005-1465-8
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 233-265
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:8:y:2005:i:3:p:233-265

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: random lottery incentive mechanism; separation hypothesis; strategies; Selten’s measure of predictive success;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hey, John D & Orme, Chris, 1994. "Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1291-1326, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Beattie, Jane & Loomes, Graham, 1997. "The Impact of Incentives upon Risky Choice Experiments," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 155-68, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-06, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Holt, Charles A, 1986. "Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 508-15, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cubitt, Robin P & Sugden, Robert, 2001. " Dynamic Decision-Making under Uncertainty: An Experimental Investigation of Choices between Accumulator Gambles," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 103-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Properties of a measure of predictive success," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 153-167, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. John D. Hey & Jinkwon Lee, 2005. "Do subjects remember the past?," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 9-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Tversky, Amos & Slovic, Paul & Kahneman, Daniel, 1990. "The Causes of Preference Reversal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 204-17, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Camerer, Colin F, 1989. " An Experimental Test of Several Generalized Utility Theories," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 61-104, April.
  10. Robin Cubitt & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 1998. "On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 115-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jinkwon Lee, 2008. "The effect of the background risk in a simple chance improving decision model," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 19-41, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. André De Palma & Nathalie Picard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2009. "Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: Evidence on the dynamics of power balance," Working Papers hal-00418899_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2006. "Risk aversion and embedding bias," Economics Working Papers 934, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. John D Hey & Gianna Lotito & Anna Maffioletti, 2008. "The Descriptive and Predictive Adequacy of Theories of Decision Making Under Uncertainty/Ambiguity," Discussion Papers 08/04, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  5. James Andreoni, 2006. "Giving Gifts to Groups: How Congestible is Altruism?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.