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Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters

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Author Info
Luis Angel Medrano
Xavier Vives

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Abstract

We provide a general framework for analyzing the effects of insider trading on real investment and welfare as well as the consequences of different regulatory policies in a model where all traders are rational expected-utility maximizers and aware of their position in the market. We find that: with costly information acquisition, an "abstain-or-disclose" rule tends to be optimal; with free information acquisition, laissez-faire is better. This suggests enforcing an abstain-or-disclose rule with a high standard of proof for inside information. Our approach also uncovers the pitfalls of welfare analysis in the noise-trader model.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal European Finance Review.

Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 199-277
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Handle: RePEc:kap:eurfin:v:8:y:2004:i:2:p:199-277

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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=111870

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Diamond, Douglas W. & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1981. "Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 221-235, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bray, Margaret, 1985. "Rational Expectations, Information and Asset Markets: An Introduction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 161-95, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bernhardt, Dan & Hughson, Eric, 2002. "Intraday trade in dealership markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1697-1732, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Moresi, Serge, 1993. "Volatility, information and noise trading," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 961-982, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Manove, Michael, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rahi, Rohit, 1996. "Adverse Selection and Security Design," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 287-300, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Damodaran, Aswath & Liu, Crocker H, 1993. "Insider Trading as a Signal of Private Information," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 79-119. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yosha Oved, 1995. "Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 3-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Spiegel, Matthew, 1991. "Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 255-82. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Khanna, Naveen & Slezak, Steve L & Bradley, Michael, 1994. "Insider Trading, Outside Search, and Resource Allocation: Why Firms and Society May Disagree on Insider Trading Restrictions," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 575-608. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Sarkar Asani, 1994. "On the Equivalence of Noise Trader and Hedger Models in Market Microstructure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 204-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Spiegel, Matthew & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive Securities Market," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 307-29. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kyle, Albert S, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 317-55, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Bernhardt, Dan & Hollifield, Burton & Hughson, Eric, 1995. "Investment and Insider Trading," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 501-43. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1022-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Demange, G. & Laroque, G., 1992. "Private Information and the Design of Securities," DELTA Working Papers 92-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  19. Demsetz, Harold, 1986. "Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 313-16, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Repullo, Rafael, 1999. "Some Remarks on Leland's Model of Insider Trading," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(263), pages 359-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-87, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Leonard J. Mirman & Marc Santugini, 2008. "A Financial Model of the Firm: Risk and Portfolio Selection," Cahiers de recherche 08-05, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cespa, Giovanni & Foucault, Thierry, 2008. "Insiders-Outsiders, Transparency and the Value of the Ticker," CEPR Discussion Papers 6794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Andrea Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2006. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 16, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Giovanni Cespa, 2007. "Information Sales and Insider Trading with Long-lived Information," CSEF Working Papers 174, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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