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Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons

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  • Francesco Parisi
  • Norbert Schulz
  • Ben Depoorter

Abstract

This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
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  • Francesco Parisi & Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, 2004. "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 175-190, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:2:p:175-190
    DOI: 10.1023/B:EJLE.0000014575.00312.15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1990. "The role of transaction costs and property rights in economic analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 450-457, May.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
    4. Schulz, Norbert, 2000. "Thoughts on the nature of vetoes when bargaining on public projects," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 17, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    5. Norbert Schulz & Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, 2002. "Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 594-613, December.
    6. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Cheol-Joo Cho, 2011. "An Analysis of the Housing Redevelopment Process in Korea through the Lens of the Transaction Cost Framework," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 48(7), pages 1477-1501, May.
    4. José António Filipe, 2014. "Tourism Destinations: A Methodological Discussion on Commons and Anti-commons. The ‘Ammaia’ Project’s Locale Impact," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 4(2), pages 725-725.
    5. Driouchi, Ahmed & Malki, Karim, 2011. "Enterprise creation & anti-commons in developing economies: evidence from World Bank doing business data," MPRA Paper 32373, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Jul 2011.
    6. Ivan Major, 2014. "A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 20(4), pages 425-437, November.
    7. Andergassen, Rainer & Candela, Guido & Figini, Paolo, 2013. "An economic model for tourism destinations: Product sophistication and price coordination," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-98.
    8. Parente, Michael D. & Winn, Abel M., 2012. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 475-490.
    9. Deng, Feng, 2008. "What Is “Open”? An Economic Analysis of Open Institutions," MPRA Paper 8888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Millsap, Adam & Hobbs, Brad & Stansel, Dean, 2017. "Local Governments and Economic Freedom: A Test of the Leviathan Hypothesis," Working Papers 07334, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    11. José António Filipe, 2014. "Tourism Destinations and Local Rental: A Discussion around Bureaucracy and Anticommons. Algarve Case (Portugal)," International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, vol. 4(4), pages 821-821.

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