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Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators

Author

Listed:
  • Akihiko Kawaura

    (Doshisha University)

  • Yasutomo Kimura

    (Otaru University of Commerce)

  • Yuzu Uchida

    (Hokkai-Gakuen University)

Abstract

This study is an empirical inquiry into the re-election of elected assembly members and investigates whether incumbents' general participation in legislative sessions is a determinant of the outcome of their re-election efforts. This study measures legislative participation based on the amount of speech on the plenary session floor during the immediately preceding term, which is tabulated from published local assembly transcripts. The data for the analysis come from 41 prefecture assemblies in Japan that held elections on the same day in April 2015. This sample enables us to test whether legislative participation has a positive electoral impact across different localities. The empirical analysis of the re-election outcomes of elected officials suggests that floor speech is a factor contributing to electoral success for assembly members. In addition, this speech effect diminishes as incumbents accumulate terms, and it is the first term legislators who benefit most from the positive re-election effect of speech.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihiko Kawaura & Yasutomo Kimura & Yuzu Uchida, 2024. "Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 123-140, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:35:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10602-023-09402-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09402-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local assembly; Election; Transcript; Japan; Prefecture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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