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Work Effort During and After Employment Probation: Evidence from German Personnel Data

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  • Pfeifer Christian

    (Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Scharnhorststr. 1, 21335 Lüneburg, Germany, and IZA Bonn)

Abstract

The degree of employment protection affects employment flows as well as work effort of employees. Whereas the former aspect has been analysed in many studies, the impact of employment protection on work effort has been analysed in few recent studies. Theory predicts that employment protection reduces work effort because employee shirking cannot be that easily punished by the firm, which decreases the separation probability and increases the expected utility for a shirker in efficiency wage models. Personnel records of a German company are used to assess the impact of lower employment protection during probation on worker absenteeism as a proxy for work effort. The main finding is that new white-collar workers are on average more than 50 percent less likely to be absent and have on average more than 60 percent fewer absent working days during the three months probation period compared to the nine months period afterwards. These relative effects differ only slightly between the genders and between different age and educational groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Pfeifer Christian, 2010. "Work Effort During and After Employment Probation: Evidence from German Personnel Data," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 230(1), pages 77-91, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:230:y:2010:i:1:p:77-91
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2010-0106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Pfeifer, 2014. "Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(5), pages 523-536, November.
    2. Verardi Vincenzo & Wagner Joachim, 2011. "Robust Estimation of Linear Fixed Effects Panel Data Models with an Application to the Exporter Productivity Premium," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 231(4), pages 546-557, August.
    3. Mirka Zvedelikova, 2024. "Does Probation Lead to Higher Starting Wage? Evidence from Japanese Online Job Ads," ISER Discussion Paper 1235, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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