IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/oropre/v69y2021i3p755-773.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Risk Management for Sustainable Sovereign Debt Financing

Author

Listed:
  • Stavros A. Zenios

    (University of Cyprus, Nicosia 2109, Cyprus; ; Bruegel, 1210 Brussels, Belgium; Wharton Financial Institutions Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 19104)

  • Andrea Consiglio

    (University of Palermo, 90133 Palermo, Italy)

  • Marialena Athanasopoulou

    (European Stability Mechanism, L-1347 Luxembourg)

  • Edmund Moshammer

    (European Stability Mechanism, L-1347 Luxembourg)

  • Angel Gavilan

    (Banco de España, 28014 Madrid, Spain)

  • Aitor Erce

    (Public University of Navarre (UPNA), 31006 Pamplona, Spain)

Abstract

We model sovereign debt sustainability with optimal financing decisions under macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal uncertainty, with endogenous risk and term premia. Using a coherent risk measure we trade off debt stock and flow risks subject to sustainability constraints. We optimize static and dynamic financing strategies and demonstrate economically significant savings from optimal financing compared with simple rules and consols, and find that optimizing the trade-offs can be critical for sustainability. The model quantifies minimum refinancing risk and maximum rate of debt reduction that a sovereign can achieve given its economic fundamentals, and an extension identifies optimal timing of flow adjustments that allow the sovereign to go beyond these limits. We put the model to the data on a eurozone crisis country, a low-debt country (Netherlands), and a high-debt country (Italy) and document the significance of the stock-flow trade-off for debt sustainability, identify potential improvements of Dutch Treasury practices, and identify unsustainability risks in the 2019 Italian budget. The model informs diverse policy decisions on sustainable public finance and is an essential building block of the European Stability Mechanism methodological framework to assess debt sustainability and repayment capacity of member states, especially in the context of financial assistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Stavros A. Zenios & Andrea Consiglio & Marialena Athanasopoulou & Edmund Moshammer & Angel Gavilan & Aitor Erce, 2021. "Risk Management for Sustainable Sovereign Debt Financing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 755-773, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:755-773
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2055
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2055
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/opre.2020.2055?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 117-125, September.
    2. Josefin Meyer & Carmen M Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(3), pages 1615-1680.
    3. Ayres, João & Navarro, Gaston & Nicolini, Juan Pablo & Teles, Pedro, 2018. "Sovereign default: The role of expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 803-812.
    4. Dias, Daniel A. & Richmond, Christine & Wright, Mark L.J., 2014. "The stock of external sovereign debt: Can we take the data at ‘face value’?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 1-17.
    5. David Bolder, 2003. "A Stochastic Simulation Framework for the Government of Canada's Debt Strategy," Staff Working Papers 03-10, Bank of Canada.
    6. Cristina Arellano & Ananth Ramanarayanan, 2012. "Default and the Maturity Structure in Sovereign Bonds," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(2), pages 187-232.
    7. Javier Bianchi & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, 2018. "International Reserves and Rollover Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2629-2670, September.
    8. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2012. "Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2674-2699, October.
    9. George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 1105-1131.
    10. Robert Barro, 2003. "Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 4(1), pages 1-15, May.
    11. Olivier J. Blanchard & Daniel Leigh, 2013. "Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 117-120, May.
    12. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2014. "Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 88-93, May.
    13. Luigi Bocola & Alessandro Dovis, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(12), pages 4343-4377, December.
    14. Balibek, Emre & Köksalan, Murat, 2010. "A multi-objective multi-period stochastic programming model for public debt management," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 205(1), pages 205-217, August.
    15. Antonio Bassanetti & Carlo Cottarelli & Andrea F Presbitero, 2019. "Lost and found: market access and public debt dynamics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 445-471.
    16. Martin Guzman & Domenico Lombardi, 2018. "Assessing the Appropriate Size of Relief in Sovereign Debt Restructuring," Documentos de trabajo del Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política IIEP (UBA-CONICET) 2018-26, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política IIEP (UBA-CONICET).
    17. Philippe Artzner & Freddy Delbaen & Jean‐Marc Eber & David Heath, 1999. "Coherent Measures of Risk," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 203-228, July.
    18. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    19. Alessandro Missale, 1997. "Managing the Public Debt: The Optimal Taxation Approach," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 235-265, September.
    20. Timothy C. Irwin, 2015. "Defining The Government'S Debt And Deficit," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 711-732, September.
    21. Barry Eichengreen & Ugo Panizza, 2016. "A surplus of ambition: can Europe rely on large primary surpluses to solve its debt problem?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 31(85), pages 5-49.
    22. Jobst, Norbert J. & Mitra, Gautam & Zenios, Stavros A., 2006. "Integrating market and credit risk: A simulation and optimisation perspective," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 717-742, February.
    23. Andrea Consiglio & Angelo Carollo & Stavros A. Zenios, 2016. "A parsimonious model for generating arbitrage-free scenario trees," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 201-212, February.
    24. Bohn, Henning, 1990. "Tax Smoothing with Financial Instruments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1217-1230, December.
    25. Eric M. Engen & R. Glenn Hubbard, 2005. "Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, Volume 19, pages 83-160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    27. R. Glenn Hubbard & Eric M. Engen, 2004. "Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates," AEI Economics Working Papers 50018, American Enterprise Institute.
    28. Carmine Gabriele & Aitor Erce & Marialena Athanasopoulou & Juan Rojas, 2017. "Debt Stocks Meet Gross Financing Needs: A Flow Perspective into Sustainability," Working Papers 24, European Stability Mechanism.
    29. Rockafellar, R. Tyrrell & Uryasev, Stanislav, 2002. "Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 1443-1471, July.
    30. Oya Celasun & Xavier Debrun & Jonathan D. Ostry, 2006. "Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries: A "Fan-Chart" Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(3), pages 1-3.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alberola, Enrique & Cheng, Gong & Consiglio, Andrea & Zenios, Stavros A., 2023. "Unconventional monetary policy and debt sustainability in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Lotfi, Somayyeh & Milidonis, Andreas & Zenios, Stavros A., 2024. "Mispricing of debt expansion in the eurozone sovereign credit market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Enrique Alberola-Ila & Gong Cheng & Andrea Consiglio & Stavros A. Zenios, 2022. "Debt sustainability and monetary policy: the case of ECB asset purchases," BIS Working Papers 1034, Bank for International Settlements.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alberola, Enrique & Cheng, Gong & Consiglio, Andrea & Zenios, Stavros A., 2023. "Unconventional monetary policy and debt sustainability in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Enrique Alberola-Ila & Gong Cheng & Andrea Consiglio & Stavros A. Zenios, 2022. "Debt sustainability and monetary policy: the case of ECB asset purchases," BIS Working Papers 1034, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Corsetti, G. & Erce, A. & Uy, T., 2018. "Debt Sustainability and the Terms of Official Support," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1864, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Marialena Athanasopoulou & Andrea Consiglio & Aitor Erce & Angel Gavilan & Edmund Moshammer & Stavros A. Zenios, 2019. "Risk Management for Sovereign Debt Financing with Sustainability Conditions," Globalization Institute Working Papers 367, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    5. Giancarlo Corsetti, 2023. "Debt crises, fast and slow Giancarlo," RSCAS Working Papers 2023/15, European University Institute.
    6. Joao Ayres & Gaston Navarro & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Pedro Teles, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises with Long Stagnations," Working Papers 757, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    7. Javier Bianchi & Jorge Mondragon, 2022. "Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(1), pages 435-491.
    8. Bernardo Guimaraes & Lucas Tumkus, 2020. "On the costs of sovereign default in quantitative models," Discussion Papers 2021, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    9. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    10. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    11. Mark Aguiar & Satyajit Chatterjee & Harold Cole & Zachary Stangebye, 2022. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(5), pages 1147-1183.
    12. Seon Tae Kim & Gabriel Mihalache & Yan Bai, 2014. "Maturity and Repayment Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2014 Meeting Papers 523, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2013. "Sovereign Debt: A Review," NBER Working Papers 19388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Javier Bianchi & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez, 2018. "International Reserves and Rollover Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2629-2670, September.
    15. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.
    16. Doemeland,Doerte & Estevão,Marcello & Jooste,Charl & Sampi Bravo,James Robert Ezequiel & Tsiropoulos,Vasileios, 2022. "Debt Vulnerability Analysis : A Multi-Angle Approach," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9929, The World Bank.
    17. Mark Aguiar & Satyajit Chatterjee & Harold L. Cole & Zachary Stangebye, 2017. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited: The Art of the Desperate Deal," Working Papers 17-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    18. Roch, Francisco & Uhlig, Harald, 2018. "The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-13.
    19. Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel, 2014. "Sovereign Debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 647-687, Elsevier.
    20. Javier Bianchi & Jorge Mondragon, 2018. "Rollover Crises and Currency Unions," 2018 Meeting Papers 1215, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:69:y:2021:i:3:p:755-773. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.