IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ijc/ijcjou/y2007q3a4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stock Liquidity Requirements and the Insurance Aspect of the Lender of Last Resort

Author

Listed:
  • Spyros Pagratis

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

This paper considers a model of information-based bank runs where a central bank sets its lender of last resort (LOLR) policy in order to maximize welfare. To mitigate the risks associated with overinvestment by the banking sector, the central bank sets prudential liquidity requirements for the banking sector in the form of a ratio of liquid assets to deposits. Liquidity requirements then provide a buffer against early deposit withdrawals, but they also allow the central bank to manufacture a distribution of costs to LOLR funding with an expected value equal to 0. It is shown that liquidity requirements, along with an appropriate LOLR policy, become welfare improving if the banking sector is characterized by high-profit opportunities, low leverage, and a relatively volatile deposit base. Otherwise, forgone productive investment due to liquidity restrictions may result in a disproportional cost to the banking sector relative to the insurance value of LOLR.

Suggested Citation

  • Spyros Pagratis, 2007. "Stock Liquidity Requirements and the Insurance Aspect of the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 119-146, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:3:a:4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q3a4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb07q3a4.htm
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2001.
    4. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring.
    5. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jose M P Jorge, 2007. "Financial System Architecture: The Role of Systemic Risk, Added Value and Liquidity," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 155, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    2. Fabio Castiglionesi & Wolf Wagner, 2012. "Turning Bagehot on His Head: Lending at Penalty Rates When Banks Can Become Insolvent," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(1), pages 201-219, February.
    3. Park, Hyun Woong & Bernardin, Thomas, 2018. "Liquidity, bank runs, and fire sales under local thinking," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 89-102.
    4. Mark A. Carlson & Burcu Duygan-Bump & William R. Nelson, 2015. "Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Rob Nijskens & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2011. "The Lender of Last Resort: Liquidity Provision versus the Possibility of Bailout," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Konstantin Milbradt, 2019. "A Model of Safe Asset Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1230-1262, April.
    7. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.
    8. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 452-484, June.
    9. Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Imperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games (October 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 211, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Eunjung Yeo & Jooyong Jun, 2020. "Peer-to-Peer Lending and Bank Risks: A Closer Look," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-17, July.
    11. Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006. "Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1720-1736, December.
    12. Naqvi, Hassan, 2015. "Banking crises and the lender of last resort: How crucial is the role of information?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 20-29.
    13. Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2014. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Influence of Money Injections on Risk Taking in Football Clubs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(4), pages 430-454, September.
    14. Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2021. "Speculative and precautionary demand for liquidity in competitive banking markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118869, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Pekka Sääskilahti, 2016. "Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 313-333, April.
    16. Augusto de la Torre & Alain Ize, 2016. "The Conceptual Foundations of Macroprudential Policy: A Roadmap," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 333-352, December.
    17. Linda Schilling, 2018. "Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution," Working Papers 2018-15, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    18. Nikolaou, Kleopatra & Drehmann, Mathias, 2009. "Funding liquidity risk: definition and measurement," Working Paper Series 1024, European Central Bank.
    19. Bonfim, D. & Kim, M., 2012. "Liquidity Risk in Banking : Is there Herding?," Other publications TiSEM 6e6df5ea-401b-49a2-b1be-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2007:q:3:a:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bank for International Settlements (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.ijcb.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.