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Costly Contract Contingencies

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Author Info
Dye, Ronald A
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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 26 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 233-50
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:26:y:1985:i:1:p:233-50

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  1. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2003. "Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship," Working Papers 249, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Game Theory and Information 9610006, EconWPA, revised 14 Oct 1996. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 2009. "Satisficing Contracts," NBER Working Papers 14654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1999. "Job characteristics, wages, and the employment contract," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 13-27. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Valeria Gattai, 2006. "From the Theory of the Firm to FDI and Internalisation: A Survey," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 65(2), pages 225-262, November. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," NBER Working Papers 13235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1996. "Decision, Contract and Emotion: Some Economics for a Complex and Confusing World," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 336., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Dana Heller & Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000978, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Complexity, Contract and the Employment Relationship," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 342., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Antonio Nicolo' & Piero Tedeschi, 2004. "Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement," Game Theory and Information 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Fregert, Klas & Jonung, Lars, 1998. "Monetary Regimes And Endogenous Wage Contracts: Sweden 1908-1995," Working Papers 1998:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Apr 1999. [Downloadable!]
  14. DESSI, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution and Strategic Incompleteness," IDEI Working Papers 465, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  15. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  16. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "A Simple Model of Secure Public Communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 101-122, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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