Economic Policies and Elections. A principal-agent point of view
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- Caleiro, António, 2004. "Economic Policies and Elections. A principal-agent point of view," EconStor Preprints 142709, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- António Caleiro, 2004. "Economic Policies and Elections, A principal-agent point of view," Economics Working Papers 9_2004, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Lohmann, Susanne, 1998. "Institutional Checks and Balances and the Political Control of the Money Supply," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 360-377, July.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1993. "Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(4), pages 663-670, October.
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Cited by:
- Caleiro, António, 2007.
"What Does Economics Assume About People’s Knowledge? Who knows?,"
EconStor Preprints
142776, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- António Caleiro, 2007. "What Does Economics Assume About People?s Knowledge? Who knows?," Economics Working Papers 04_2007, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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