Research on Strategy Optimization of Green Agricultural Production Trusteeship to Promote Black Land Protection

The whole trusteeship of green agricultural production plays an important role in promoting the protection of black land, and it is particularly crucial to clarify the behavioral characteristics and game relationships of agents involved in the whole trusteeship. This study uses the dynamic evolutionary game method to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of governments, service organizations and farmers participating in the whole trusteeship of green agricultural production, aiming to come up with effective strategies to promote the widespread application of green agricultural production trusteeship and achieve agricultural green development. The results are as follows: (1) At present, the agricultural production model in Northeast China is dominated by traditional agricultural production and supplemented by green agricultural production. (2) Incentive and punitive measures will encourage agents to adopt positive strategies. (3) In areas with a poor awareness of green agricultural production trusteeship, the government’s incentive and punishment measures for farmers and service organizations are imbalanced. (4) The relatively high cost of trusteeship leads to a lack of market competitiveness, which has a negative impact on service organizations promoting green agricultural production trusteeship. This study provides an effective reference for improving the overall implementation effect of black land protection in Northeast China.