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Outsourcing under incomplete information

Author

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  • Tarun Kabiraj
  • Uday Bhanu Sinha

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing. Design/methodology/approach - The present paper constructs a model of two firms interacting in the product market under asymmetric information where one firm has private information about its technological capability, and it has the option to produce inputs in-house or buy inputs from an input market. However, using outsourced inputs involves a fixed cost at the plant level. The model solves for perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Findings - There are situations when under complete information, outsourcing of the input will not occur, but, under incomplete information, either only the low-cost type or both high and low-cost types will go for outsourcing, and there always exist reasonable beliefs supporting these equilibria. In particular, when the fixed cost is neither too small not too large, a separating equilibrium occurs in which the low-cost type outsources inputs from the input market but the high-cost type produces in-house; hence, outsourcing signals the firm’s type. Outsourcing by only the high-cost type firm will never occur in equilibrium. Originality/value - That incomplete or asymmetric information can itself be a reason for strategic outsourcing is never identified in the literature. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap and raise the issue of outsourcing in an incomplete information environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarun Kabiraj & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2017. "Outsourcing under incomplete information," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 3-15, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:igdrpp:igdr-03-2017-0014
    DOI: 10.1108/IGDR-03-2017-0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buehler, Stefan & Haucap, Justus, 2006. "Strategic outsourcing revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 325-338, November.
    2. Kabiraj, Tarun & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2016. "Strategic outsourcing with technology transfer under price competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 281-290.
    3. Arie Lewin & Silvia Massini & Carine Peeters, 2008. "Why are companies offshoring innovation ?the emerging global race for talent," Working Papers CEB 08-009, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    5. Pack, Howard & Saggi, Kamal, 2001. "Vertical technology transfer via international outsourcing," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 389-415, August.
    6. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf & David E. M. Sappington, 2008. "The Make-or-Buy Decision in the Presence of a Rival: Strategic Outsourcing to a Common Supplier," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(10), pages 1747-1758, October.
    7. Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2016. "Economies of Scale and (Non)Existence of Strategic Outsourcing in Cournot Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(3), pages 1260-1266.
    8. Tarun Kabiraj & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2014. "Strategic Outsourcing with Technology Transfer under Cournot Competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1133-1140.
    9. Hamid Beladi & Sugata Marjit & Lei Yang, 2012. "Outsourcing: Volume and Composition of R&D," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 828-840, September.
    10. Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "International Outsourcing and R&D: Long‐Run Implications for Consumers," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 1010-1022, November.
    11. Yutian Chen, 2011. "Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 137-156, March.
    12. Arie Lewin & Silvia Massini & Carine Peeters, 2009. "Why are companies offshoring innovation the emerging global race for talent (Journal of International Business Studies (2009) 40 (901-925) DOI:10.1057/jibs.2008.92)," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/205625, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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