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Estándares vs sistemas de permisos transables con costos de fiscalización

Author

Listed:
  • Fajardo, Germán Darío

    (Universidad de Concepción, Chile)

  • Chávez, Carlos

    (Universidad de Concepción, Chile)

Abstract

We study the cost effectiveness property of different control strategies for improving environmental quality. Our prospective analysis considers the application of Transferable Emissions Permit System (TEPS), Transferable Ambient Permit System (TAPS) and Standards (Std) applied on fix sources in Bogota-Colombia. A numerical simulation model allowed us to obtain costs of each regulatory system, which were compared with associated environmental quality. The results show that the most cost effective regulation for any environmental quality goal is TEPS, followed by TAPS and finally Std. In addition, the paper presents a new conceptual result on the enforcement strategies for a regulatory instrument that considers a spatially differentiated pollutant. The results suggest that for any goal of environmental improvement, a TAPS induce compliance cheaper than in any other regulatory system under consideration.// Estudiamos la propiedad de costo efectividad de diferentes estrategias de regulación tendientes a mejorar la calidad ambiental. Nuestro análisis prospectivo considera la aplicación de sistema de permisos de emisión transable (SPET), sistema de permisos ambientales transables (SPAT) y estándares (Est) de fuentes fijas en Bogotá, Colombia. Un modelo de simulación numérica permitió obtener costos de cumplimiento de cada sistema de regulación, los cuales fueron comparados con la calidad ambiental inducida. Los resultados permiten concluir que el instrumento de más costo efectivo para cualquier meta de calidad ambiental es el SPET, seguido del SPAT y finalmente los Est. Además, el artículo presenta un nuevo resultado conceptual de la elaboración de estrategias de fiscalización para instrumentos de regulación que consideran la contaminación de forma espacialmente diferenciada. Los resultados sugieren que, para cualquier meta de mejoramiento ambiental, inducir cumplimiento en un SPAT es más barato que hacerlo en cualquier otro sistema de regulación considerado

Suggested Citation

  • Fajardo, Germán Darío & Chávez, Carlos, 2012. "Estándares vs sistemas de permisos transables con costos de fiscalización," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(313), pages 125-155, enero-mar.
    • Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:79:y:2012:i:313:p:125-155
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v79i313.57
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Política ambiental; costo-efectividad; fiscalización; costos de cumplimiento;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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