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Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania

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  • D’Exelle, Ben
  • Lecoutere, Els
  • Van Campenhout, Bjorn

Abstract

This article studies how users of scarce common water resources deal with equity-efficiency trade-offs. For this purpose, we conduct a field lab experiment in Tanzania that simulates the distribution of irrigation water between upstream and downstream users. We find a strong preference for equal sharing even if this comes with large foregone efficiency gains. However, we also find indications that efficiency considerations are taken into account. (Selfish) deviations from equal sharing are more likely implemented when they are efficiency-enhancing. Finally, we detect a tendency to alternate between altruistic and selfish sharing, which reconciles equity and efficiency considerations.

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  • D’Exelle, Ben & Lecoutere, Els & Van Campenhout, Bjorn, 2012. "Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2537-2551.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:12:p:2537-2551
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.026
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    4. Fitsum Assefa Adela & Joachim Aurbacher & Gumataw Kifle Abebe, 2019. "Small-scale irrigation scheme governance - poverty nexus: evidence from Ethiopia," Food Security: The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food, Springer;The International Society for Plant Pathology, vol. 11(4), pages 897-913, August.
    5. Raphaëlle Ducrot & Magalie Bourblanc, 2017. "Promoting equity in water access: the limits of fairness of a rural water programme in semi‐arid Mozambique," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(3), pages 131-144, August.

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