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Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America

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  • Taliercio, Robert Jr.

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  • Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:32:y:2004:i:2:p:213-232
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    Cited by:

    1. Moore, Mick, 2014. "Revenue Reform and Statebuilding in Anglophone Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 99-112.
    2. Christian Ebeke & M Mansour & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2016. "The Power to Tax in Sub-Saharan Africa: LTUs, VATs, and SARAs," Working Papers halshs-01332049, HAL.
    3. Andre Gbato & Falapalaki Lemou & Jean-François Brun, 2021. "Effectiveness of SARA reform in sub-Saharan Africa [Efficacité de la réforme des SARA en Afrique subsaharienne]," Working Papers hal-03119001, HAL.
    4. Heidi Jane Smith & Isabel Melguizo, 2019. "Over indebted Subnational Mexico: Does political polarization affect debt policy decisions?," Working Paper Series Sobre México 2019001, Sobre México. Temas en economía.
    5. Paul Smoke, 2013. "Why Theory and Practice are Different: The Gap Between Principles and Reality in Subnational Revenue Systems," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1313, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 2006. "Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2014. "Taxation and Democratization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 287-301.
    8. te Lintelo, Dolf J.H. & Lakshman, Rajith W.D., 2015. "Equate and Conflate: Political Commitment to Hunger and Undernutrition Reduction in Five High-Burden Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 280-292.
    9. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad & Mick Moore, 2007. "Taxation and State Building: Poor Countries in a Globalised World," CMI Working Papers 11, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    10. repec:gei:journl:v:2:y:2017:i:2:p:165-175 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Mavungu, Marina Ngoma & Krsic, Nikolina, 2017. "Assessing the impact of tax administration reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa," MPRA Paper 89275, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Heidi Jane Smith, 2019. "Increasing Decision Making Capacities of Local Governments: Mexico?s Quest for Economic Growth," Working Paper Series Sobre México 2019002, Sobre México. Temas en economía.
    13. Roel Dom, 2017. "Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Silver Bullet or White Elephant," Discussion Papers 2017-01, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    14. Marcus André Melo & Armando Barrientos & André Canuto Coelho, 2014. "Taxation, redistribution and the social contract in Brazil," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series iriba_wp11, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    15. Onesmo Kaiya Mackenzie, 2021. "Efficiency of tax revenue administration in Africa," Working Papers 02/2021, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
    16. Imtiaz Arif, Lubna Khan, Faheem Hussain, 2017. "Impact of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority on Tax Revenue and Buoyancy: Evidence from Pakistan," Journal of Finance and Economics Research, Geist Science, Iqra University, Faculty of Business Administration, vol. 2(2), pages 164-174, October.

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