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Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility

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  • Rosston, Gregory L.
  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

Abstract

Unlocking spectrum from inefficient, inflexible uses assigned mostly prior to the 1990s to a more efficient, flexible-use model is a key challenge for the Federal Communications Commission. This paper focuses on transitions of spectrum use and looks at how the FCC attempted to minimize transaction and holdout costs while also facilitating competition among service providers. The FCC's recent Broadcast Incentive Auction provides a case study to examine tradeoffs between centralized mechanisms and “overlay” auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosston, Gregory L. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2021. "Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(7).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:45:y:2021:i:7:s0308596121000719
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2021.102167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 647-675, October.
    2. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, 2009. "A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 424-454, September.
    3. Gregory Rosston, 2014. "Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation," Discussion Papers 13-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    4. Rosston, Gregory L., 2003. "The long and winding road: the FCC paves the path with good intentions," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 501-515, August.
    5. Gregory Rosston, 2014. "Increasing the Efficiency of Spectrum Allocation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 45(3), pages 221-243, November.
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