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The unfinished history of usage rights for spectrum

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  • Cave, Martin
  • Webb, William

Abstract

The key task in the next stage of spectrum management is to adapt regulation to the prospect of widespread sharing, on a much more sophisticated basis than sharing is used today. There is a role for the regulator to take steps to expand the area of choice within which public and private sector users can operate. This is best done in general by enhancing the flexibility of usage rights, which itself is best achieved by enhancing the freedom to trade them in the dimensions of time, space, level of interference and priority of access, by subdividing, re-aggregating, etc. However, there are considerable transactions cost impediments to trading where unlicensed users are involved. This creates a role for the regulator pro-actively to investigate different allocations, to make provisions for the most promising to occur and to incorporate both in refarming exercises and in primary assignments based on auctions configurations of usage rights, which might favour promising avenues of shared spectrum use.

Suggested Citation

  • Cave, Martin & Webb, William, 2012. "The unfinished history of usage rights for spectrum," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 293-300.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:36:y:2012:i:4:p:293-300
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.12.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2017. "The Future of International Radio Regulations: Transformation Towards Sharing," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169457, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    2. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2014. "International spectrum management regime: Is gridlock blocking flexible spectrum property rights?," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106866, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. Minervini, Leo Fulvio, 2014. "Spectrum management reform: Rethinking practices," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 136-146.
    4. Chou, Yuntsai, 2014. "A compensation model developed to liberalize spectrum in the G4 era," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106897, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    5. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2016. "Wireless access policy for electronic communications services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 821-835.
    6. Chou, Yuntsai & Hu, Weimin & Lien, Hsienming, 2015. "A compensation model developed to increase spectrum usage efficiency in the 4G era," 2015 Regional ITS Conference, Los Angeles 2015 146334, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    7. Basaure, Arturo & Marianov, Vladimir & Paredes, Ricardo, 2015. "Implications of dynamic spectrum management for regulation," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 563-579.
    8. Jain, Rekha & Dara, Rishabh, 2017. "Framework for evolving spectrum management regimes: Lessons from India," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 473-485.
    9. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2014. "Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice," 25th European Regional ITS Conference, Brussels 2014 101380, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    10. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2016. "International Radio Spectrum Management Regime: Restricting or Enabling Opportunistic Access in the TVWS?," 27th European Regional ITS Conference, Cambridge (UK) 2016 148666, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

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