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Regulatory triggers and New Source Review

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  • Calcott, Paul

Abstract

Firms can sometimes preempt regulation by changing the nature, scale or location of their activities. The objectives of this paper are to model such preemptive behavior and to draw out implications for regulatory design. Applications to New Source Review are emphasized. Regulatory triggers defined on emissions have a clear rationale. A modest trigger on refurbishment expenditures is sometimes beneficial, depending on the sources of variation among firms. However, such benefits are likely to be small.

Suggested Citation

  • Calcott, Paul, 2012. "Regulatory triggers and New Source Review," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 337-348.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:34:y:2012:i:3:p:337-348
    DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.02.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Offsetting behavior; Environmental regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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