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Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence

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  • Epple, Dennis

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  • Epple, Dennis, 1998. "Rent control with reputation: theory and evidence," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 679-710, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:28:y:1998:i:6:p:679-710
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dennis Epple & Michael Riordan, 1987. "Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 41-73, September.
    2. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    3. George Fallis & Lawrence B. Smith, 1985. "Price Effects of Rent Control on Controlled and Uncontrolled Rental Housing in Toronto: A Hedonic Index Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(3), pages 652-659, August.
    4. Buchanan, James M & Bush, Winston C, 1974. "Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(2), pages 153-157, May.
    5. Olsen, Edgar O, 1972. "An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(6), pages 1081-1100, Nov.-Dec..
    6. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
    7. Marks, Denton, 1984. "The effects of partial-coverage rent control on the price and quantity of rental housing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 360-369, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Blair Jenkins, 2009. "Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 6(1), pages 73-112, January.
    2. Basu, Kaushik & Emerson, Patrick M, 2000. "The Economics of Tenancy Rent Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 939-962, October.
    3. Joel Slemrod, 2002. "Trust in Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 9187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hans Lind, 2001. "Rent Regulation: A Conceptual And Comparative Analysis," European Journal of Housing Policy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 1(1), pages 41-57.
    5. Weber, Jan Philip & Lee, Gabriel, . "On the Measure of Private Rental Market Regulation Index and its Effect on Housing Rents: Cross Country Evidence," Beiträge zur Immobilienwirtschaft, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics, number 21.
    6. Leonardo Gonzalez Tejeda, 2005. "Politica de control de rentas e inversion bajo incertidumbre," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 1(2), pages 81-101, Enero-Jun.
    7. Zheng, Diehang & Deng, Yongheng & Gordon, Peter & Dale-Johnson, David, 2007. "An examination of the impact of rent control on mobile home prices in California," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 209-242, June.

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