IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v63y2020ics0176268020300331.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why biased agencies could be the best monitors

Author

Listed:
  • Music, Kasim
  • Salzmann, Christian

Abstract

We analyze the delegation of anti-cheating enforcement to national agencies in a Tullock contest in which competitors expend resources to win a prize. In such a setting, there are two sources of inefficiency. First, monitoring is beneficial to the principal and costly to the agent. The resulting incentive problems and solutions are well described in the literature. However, since cheating is a hidden act, the incentive effect worsens and standard solutions fail to establish an efficient outcome. Second, agencies may prefer a particular outcome of the contest and may prefer their own compatriots to prevail over others, which we label the bias effect. We show that the proper monitoring design can solve both problems and transform the bias effect into intrinsic motivation.

Suggested Citation

  • Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300331
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101885
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268020300331
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101885?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roland Kirstein, 2014. "Doping, the Inspection Game, and Bayesian Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 15(4), pages 385-409, August.
    2. Roland Strausz, 1997. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 337-357.
    3. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
    4. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi‐tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
    5. Siano, Alfonso & Vollero, Agostino & Conte, Francesca & Amabile, Sara, 2017. "“More than words”: Expanding the taxonomy of greenwashing after the Volkswagen scandal," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 27-37.
    6. Scott M. Gilpatric, 2011. "Cheating In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 1042-1053, October.
    7. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
    8. Scott M. Gilpatric & Cristina M. Reiser, 2017. "Why Zero Tolerance Of Misconduct Is Undesirable In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1145-1160, April.
    9. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    10. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "Productive versus destructive efforts in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 461-468.
    11. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
    12. Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008. "On cheating, doping and whistleblowing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 415-436, June.
    13. Kasim Music, 2020. "The Undesirable Consequences of Doping Regulations: Why Stricter Efforts Might Strengthen Doping Incentives," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(3), pages 281-303, April.
    14. Vijay Mohan & Bharat Hazari, 2016. "Cheating in Contests," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(7), pages 736-747, October.
    15. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Westmattelmann & Marius Sprenger & Sascha Hokamp & Gerhard Schewe, 2020. "Money matters: The impact of prize money on doping behaviour," Sport Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 688-703, October.
    2. Scott M. Gilpatric & Ye Hong, 2023. "Optimal Contest Design When Policing Damaging Behavior," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-22, June.
    3. Wolfgang Maennig & Viktoria C. E. Schumann, 2022. "Prevention Effect of News Shocks in Anti-Doping Policies," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 23(4), pages 431-459, May.
    4. Andreas Goetsch & Christian Salzmann, 2019. "The Impact of Contest Dynamics on Ex Post Doping Audits," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(3), pages 411-427, April.
    5. Scott M. Gilpatric & Cristina M. Reiser, 2017. "Why Zero Tolerance Of Misconduct Is Undesirable In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1145-1160, April.
    6. Wu, Qin & Bayer, Ralph-C & Lenten, Liam J.A., 2020. "Conditional Pension Funds to Combat Cheating in Sporting Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    7. Müller, Daniel, 2013. "The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests," Working papers 2013/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    8. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
    9. Berno Buechel & Eike Emrich & Stefanie Pohlkamp, 2016. "Nobody’s Innocent," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(8), pages 767-789, December.
    10. Nicolas Eber, 2011. "Fair play in contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 253-270, July.
    11. Guy Elaad & Artyom Jelnov, 2018. "Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 375-387, October.
    12. Kasim Music, 2020. "The Undesirable Consequences of Doping Regulations: Why Stricter Efforts Might Strengthen Doping Incentives," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(3), pages 281-303, April.
    13. Andreas Goetsch & Christian Salzmann, 2018. "The Role of Ex Post Audits in Doping Enforcement," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(7), pages 960-976, October.
    14. Nicolas Eber, 2012. "Doping and Anti-doping Measures," Chapters, in: Wolfgang Maennig & Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Jonas Send, 2021. "Contest Copycats: Adversarial Duplication of Effort in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    16. Haß, Lars Helge & Müller, Maximilian A. & Vergauwe, Skrålan, 2015. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 251-267.
    17. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
    18. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control and Market Size with an Application to Kyrgyzstan Dairy," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    19. Volker Robeck, 2014. "Professional Cycling and the Fight against Doping," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201456, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    20. Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2013. "Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 120-134.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300331. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.